[48] { umeis de}, you are masters of the situation. It lies with you to carry on, etc.; { dioikeite} is of course imperative.

[50] Reading, after Zurborg, { dia ta ellimenia}. Or, if the vulg. { dia en limeni}, transl. "an augmentation of market dues at Piraeus."

[51] I.e. as fixed capital, or, "you should expend on plant."

[52] Or, adopting Zurborg's emend, { os an pleista eggignetai}, transl. "for the purposes of the present scheme as far as it may be available."

Again, if there is an apprehension on the part of any that the whole scheme[53] will crumble into nothing on the first outbreak of war, I would only beg these alarmists to note that, under the condition of things which we propose to bring about, war will have more terrors for the attacking party than for this state. Since what possession I should like to know can be more serviceable for war than that of men? Think of the many ships which they will be capable of manning on public service. Think of the number who will serve on land as infantry [in the public service] and will bear hard upon the enemy. Only we must treat them with courtesy.[54] For myself, my calculation is, that even in the event of war we shall be quite able to keep a firm hold of the silver mines. I may take it, we have in the neighbourhood of the mines certain fortresses--one on the southern slope in Anaphlystus;[55] and we have another on the northern side in Thoricus, the two being about seven and a half miles[56] apart. Suppose then a third breastwork were to be placed between these, on the highest point of Besa, that would enable the operatives to collect into one out of all the fortresses, and at the first perception of a hostile movement it would only be a short distance for each to retire into safety.[57] In the event of an enemy advancing in large numbers they might certainly make off with whatever corn or wine or cattle they found outside. But even if they did get hold of the silver ore, it would be little better to them than a heap of stones.[58] But how is an enemy ever to march upon the mines in force? The nearest state, Megara, is distant, I take it, a good deal over sixty miles;[59] and the next closest, Thebes, a good deal nearer seventy.[60] Supposing then an enemy to advance from some such point to attack the mines, he cannot avoid passing Athens; and presuming his force to be small, we may expect him to be annihilated by our cavalry and frontier police.[61] I say, presuming his force to be small, since to march with anything like a large force, and thereby leave his own territory denuded of troops, would be a startling achievement. Why, the fortified city of Athens will be much closer the states of the attacking parties than they themselves will be by the time they have got to the mines. But, for the sake of argument, let us suppose an enemy to have arrived in the neighbourhood of Laurium; how is he going to stop there without provisions? To go out in search of supplies with a detachment of his force would imply risk, both for the foraging party and for those who have to do the fighting;[62] whilst, if they are driven to do so in force each time, they may call themselves besiegers, but they will be practically in a state of siege themselves.

[53] Or, "the proposed organisation."

[55] Or, reading { en te pros mesembrian thalatte}, "on the southern Sea." For Anaphlystus see "Hell." I. ii. 1; "Mem." III. v. 25. It was Eubulus's deme, the leading statesman at this date.

[57] The passage { sunekoi t an erga}, etc., is probably corrupt. { Ta erga} seems to mean "the operatives;" cf. Latin "operae." Others take it of "the works themselves." Possibly it may refer to military works connecting the three fortresses named. "There might be a system of converging (works or) lines drawn to a single point from all the fortresses, and at the first sign of any thing hostile," etc.

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